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Gabriele Jahn, Matthias Schramm & Achim Spiller (2005) ‘’The Reliability of Certification: Quality
Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool’‘

Paper, Journal of Consumer Policy (2005) 28: 53–73

Document:
jahn_et_al_2005_fulltext.pdf

Abstract
Given the large number of certification systems in the food industry, it is surprising that there are only a few research approaches to the economics of certification. Certification schemes are used to ensure marketing claims for unobservable quality
attributes. Under asymmetric information, process-oriented quality characteristics such as organic farming, animal welfare, or fair trade raise the question of mislabelling. In the long run, only a reliable control procedure can reduce the risk of food scandals. The article presents a model which includes several starting points to enhance the efficiency of certification systems and the corresponding labels. On the whole, tendencies towards
price wars on the certification market and considerable differences in performance reveal
the necessity of institutional changes. Strategies for reducing auditors’ dependence, intensifying liability, increasing reputation effects, and minimizing audit costs are suggested. Finally, policy implications for public and private monitoring are discussed.

Keywords: ecomonics of certification, structure of certification, auditing, asymmetruc information & labelling

Relevance to our study:
The paper outlines the research approaches to the economics of certification, presenting a model which provides some starting points to enhance the efficiency of certification systems and the corresponding labels. The paper discusses the policy implications for public and private monitoring.

Relevancy on a scale from 1 to 5 = 4

Review status: Finished
Review started on 2009–04–16
Reviewed by Jane Vine?

Comments: